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BUFFALO
VOLUME I

LAW REVIEW
SPRING, 1951

NUMBER I

RES IPSA LOQUITUR VINDICATED
LOUIS L. JAFFE*
Two of our most distinguished tort skippers, Dean Prosser' and Professor
Seavey,' have recently thrown overboard res ipsa loquitur. It is, they say,
superfluous timber, tabula in naufragio at best; a great many judges fell overboard (or were thrown out) at the same time and are still hopefully clinging
to the doctrine. Their thesis is that the concept of res ipsa loquiturwhere it is
correctly applied is redundant and where it is not redundant it is wrong. Now,
a concept which produces wrong results may indeed be wrong but it cannot
at the same time be redundant. I suspect that as the law has stood until very
recently res ipsa has been neither redundant nor wrong; but that changes now
taking place in the burden of proof may render it obsolete. It is not the
least important aspect of our thinking about res ipsa that we consider what
is happening to notions of burden of proof, particularly in the field of negligence. And, in this connection we shall be compelled to re-examine the authority of Galbraith v. Busch.'
The argument starts with Byrne v. Boadle. A barrel fell out of the defendant's warehouse onto the plaintiff's head. This evidence standing alone
was held sufficient to warrant the jury in finding negligence. The thing speaks
for itself, said Baron Pollock. This is no more, says Dean Prosser, than an
illustration of the general proposition that a case may be proved by adequate
circumstantial evidence. Both in the criminal and the civil law a defendant
may be found liable though there is no direct proof of the liability-creating act.
If the evidence gives rise to a legitimate inference the jury may find the fact
without benefit of the magic formula res ipsa loquitur, which neither'adds nor
subtracts from the case. If an inference of negligence is not legitimate then
the case should not go to the jury.
Dean Prosser asserts the equivalence of the basic rule of proof and res
ipsa as follows:
*Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School. See A Note
from the Editor, supra p. ix.
1. Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,37 CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1049). Cited hereafter as Prosser.
2. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1950).
3. 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935).

4. 2 H. & C. 722 (1863).
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"In negligence cases he [the plaintiff] is required only to convince the
jury that it is more likely that his injuries were caused by negligence than
that they were not. He must do so by evidence, and not by mere speculation
and conjecture, and where the probabilities are at best evenly balanced between negligence and its absence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the
jury that there is no sufficient proof."' But a few lines on this expression is
significantly qualified by the conclusion that the judge must leave the question
to the jury "where reasonable men may differ as to the balance of probability."
Thus the judge is to direct a verdict if the probabilities are evenly balanced
but is not to direct a verdict if reasonable men might differ as to whether they
are equally balanced. This assumes a judge who is capable of exact calculations of probability. He would distinguish the 50-50 cases from the cases
where reasonable men may differ. Such a man will render obsolete the most
advanced mechanical brains. There is to my mind an unresolved tension or
even contradiction between these two statements which, if more closely examined, may throw light on the historic role of res ipsa.
Dean Prosser observes that res ipsa is no exception to "these familiar
rules." He lists cases where the doctrine has been applied. In most of them
one would agree that the result would follow from application of the normal
rule of proof. It is easy then to fall into the habit of regarding the rest of
them as of the same species. One of them is the kind of case which troubled
the Court of Appeals in Galbraith v. Busch. An automobile driven by the defendant leaves the road for some unexplained reason; th., plaintiff, a passenger
(not for hire) is injured. Can he recover on no other proof than of the unexplained accident? In a California case which involved such facts plus proof
of a broken steering wheel-broken apparently coincident with or after the
departure from the road-it was held that he might.' Dean Prosser appears
to agree: he believes therefore that there is evidence that the driver's negligence is more probable than not. It is in his terms a case of "circumstantial"
evidence.
Yet if we give those terms meanings roughly equivalent to their traditional
meanings-and it is those which he purpor'ts to be using-it is not at all
obvious that the evidence in the case satisfies them. At least, six judges
of the Court of Appeals, led by Judge Lehman (in Galbraith v. Busch) thought
otherwise. There the defendant drove the plaintiff, a gratuitous passenger, in
his automobile on a bright clear day. The automobile left the road. The Court
held that the plaintiff must be non-suited. The Court below had permitted a
recovery based on res ipsa. Judge Lehman started with the premise that the
defendant would be liable for negligent operation of the car but not for mechanical failure (unless he had known of the defect). Accepting Dean Prosser's
5. Prosser at 194.
6. Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal. App. 180, 257 Pac. 877 (1927).
2

RES IPSA LOQUITUR VINDICATED
view of res ipsa he arrives at the conclusion that its operation adds nothing to
an other wise insufficient case.
"The problem in each case is whether the circumstances unexplained do
justify an inference of negligence. * * * In the administration of the law arbitrary rules cannot be substituted for logically probative evidence. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule. It is rather a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantive evidence. It requires evidence which shows at least probability that a particular accident could not
have occurred without lega.l wrong by the defendant."'
What, then! Was there not "at least [a] probability,' of negligence in
this case?
But, adds the Judge:
"The evidence, though unexplained, cannot possibly lead to an inference
that the accident was due to lack of care in the operation of the automobile,
for the probability that it occurred from a break in its mechanism is at least
equally great."
How account for the difference between the California and the New York
cases? Is it merely of judgment as to facts? Of a differing appraisal of the
"probabilities" within a common concept of the burden of proof? The reader
may remember the somewhat contraductory definition of burden of proof given
by Dean Prosser. Where the probabilities are balanced the plaintiff, he says,
must be non-suited but "where reasonable men may differ as to the balance
of probabilities" it must go to the jury. If as Judge Lehman thought the probability of innocence was "at least equally great" as that of negligence, which
of Dean Prosser's two ideas is applicable? It depends, he says, on whether a
reasonable man could say that one is greater than the other. All right, could
he? I maintain that once that question is put and squarely faced it becomes
obvious that the formula is an abitraction lacking workable terms. It ignores
the key to the traditional concept. All the modern emphasis is coming to be
placed on this fashionable word "probability" whereas the key words are
"speculation and conjecture." These words which are treated
as so much surplusage are in fact of the essence. Keeping them in mind the judgment in Galbraith v. Busch makes sense at least in terms of traditional notions of proof.
Let us assume, as Lehman did, that he somehow knows-though, how he could
k'now is a mystery-that the probabilities were 50-50, or let us assume in
Prosser's terms that a "reasonable man" could find that the "probabilities" were
55-45 or even 60-40 in favor of negligence. Nevertheless on either hypothesis
if the tradition is followed there is no case for the jury. Why? Because it
cannot decide the case except by "speculation." Liability-in the traditional
7. 267 N. Y. at 234, 196 N. E. at 38.
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view-is not based on the "balance of probabilities" bpt on a finding of the fact.
I am perfectly aware that abstract probability may play a role in finding a fact,
but what is referred to in the traditional formula is the greater probability in
the case at hand. The "probabilities" in the abstract or statistical sense is only
a datum. The jury's quest for the fact can only be undertaken if there is evidence in addition to that upon which the mere abstraction is based which will
enable the jury to make a reasoned choice between the competing possibilities.
The conditions for a finding are not satisfied merely by showing a greater statistical probability. If all that can be said is that there are 55 chances of
negligence out of 100, that is not enough. There must be a rational, i.e.,
evidentiary basis on which the jury can choose the competing probabilities. If
there is not, the finding will be based (in the words of the formula) on mere
speculation and conjecture. And if in these two cases, Galbraith v. Busch and
the California analogue, the result must be worked out in terms of traditional
burden of proof rules, I think the New York case is clearly correct and the California case wrong.
On the other hand if there is or ought to be a special rule of proof, called
by many courts, as I gather, res ipsa loquitur, then the California case could be
correct and the New York case wrong. Now I suspect that a good deal of legal
criticism is the more or less unconscious substitution of a fashionable form of
words for an older form of vords; and it is not unusual for a linguistic critic
himself to fall into a trap. That appears to me to be happening here in these
easy off-the-cuff assertions about probability. What, indeed, do we know in
many of these cases of so-called circumstantial evidence-and particularly the
one in question-of the degree of probability? How does judge Lehman know
that the probability of mechanical defect is equally as great as that of negligent
operation? What, perhaps, the Judge means is that in the absence of specific
information we have no more reason for attributing the accident to one cause
than to the other. This is surely not the same thing as saying that the probabilities are of equal magnitude. As a matter of fact it is said that studies showed
that only 31/2% of the cars in accidents have mechanical defects and in only
!/ of 1% do these defects play a part.'
This mode of achieving solutions by easy assumptions concerning "probability" is nicely illustrated in Dean Prosser's treatment of collisions. "The
whole problem," he says, "of the application of res ipsa loquitur is brought to
a head in the collision cases."' If A and B each driving vehicles collide, can a
passenger of A or B recover against A or B without more proof thar of the
collision itself? Usually it is held that if the defendant is a carrier and the
8. In James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L.
Rv. 769 at 770 (1950).
9. Prosser at 204.
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plaintiff is his passenger the doctrine of res ipsa applies, but otherwise not.10
This distinction, as Dean Prosser says, can hardly be explained on the ground
that the "probabilities" are different in one case than in the other. And since
there is no reason for concluding that A or B is the more likely to have been
negligent, he appears to approve decisions holding that res ipsa is inapplicable
to such suits, which is to say that on ordinary rules of proof the evidence is
inadequate. But then he is confronted with Godfrey v. Brown" in which the
California court did apply res ipsa in a collision case in favor of A's guest
against A. "It left entirely unexpluined," says Dean Prosser, "and it appears
quite impossible to explain, the distinction between the private host and the
driver of the other car.""
So far so good, but then in a startling Statue of Liberty play he suggests
that the case is wrong only because it does not go far enough. It would be
correct if res ipsa applied against both A and B. Why? Because there is a
"greater probability that both drivers were at fault." "Certainly that is the
experience of liability insurance companies and is the reason for much of the
recent agitation for vehicle accident compensation laws and comparative negligence statutes." I am not at all sure what Dean Prosser's statement about
greater probability means. That it is more probable that both drivers were
negligent than that both were not negligent? or more probable that both were
negligent ihan that either one or the other was negligent? His following
remarks only make the argument more obscure. "At least there is evidence,"
be says, "thai someone was negligent. It is not a question of whether this
negligence is more likely to be thaf of A than B, butwhether the collision itself
is sufficient evidence against each." But of course under the usual rules of
burden of proof there must be evidence from which it appears that A was more
probably negligent than not, and that B was more probably negligent than not.
When a driver, he says, goes off the highway or collides with a stationary
object the normal experience is that he has been negligent and res ipsa applies
(Judge Lehman was unfamiliar with this inference). Why, he continues, any
other conclusion when he collides with a moving object, which due care requires him to look out for and avoid? The probability of A's negligence when
A hits a stationary object is thus easily equated to the situation vhen he collides with another free-moving man-directed object. Where does this convenient datum come from? Is it a normal inference? In the traditional terms
of proof-of reasoning on sufficient evidence to a conclusion-is there anything
10. Plumb v. Richmond, Light & R. Co., 223 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922).
A recent Kentucky case rather curiously takes the position that res ipsa loquitur
applies only If the passenger in his suit against the carrier joins the person responsible for the operation of the other vehicle. Vogt v. Clnn. Ry., 312 Ky. 668, 229 S. W.
2d 461 (1950).
11. 220 Cal. 57, 29 P. 2d 165 (1934).
12. Prosser at 207.
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in the mere fact of a collision that will enable a jury to conclude that the driver
of one car was negligent? the driver of the other? It is obvious, I think, that
in afgument such as this abstract statistical probabilities (and even the
statistics are assertions without experimental verification) are taking the place
of proof. In short this is the process known to the law as presumption rather
than proof and the conclusion seems inescapable that we are in the presence
of a special doctrine.
The doctrine of res ipsa does rest on probability. It takes a case to the
jury where the degree of probability is indeterminate and there is not sufficient
evidence to apply it to the case at hand. But what is the argument for putting
to a jury a case such as Galbraith v. Busch or Gidfrey v. Brown? That
justification can there be for putting to a jury a case in which a "rational"
finding of liability cannot be made? The reason is two-fold. Our experience
and understanding of such situations indicates a substantial, if indeterminate,
probability of negligence. In short, there is a substantial probability that the
plaintiff may have a cause of action. Now ordinarily that fact alone would not
warrant a judgment against the defendant. But typically, if not invariably,
in this class of case the defendant has greater access to the facts than the
plaintiff. This is the significance of the usual requirement for res ipsa that the
defendant be in control of the mischief-working instrumentality!' Res ipsa
rests on the notion that it is fair to treat the probability as the faQt if the defendant has the power to rebut the inference.
Dean Prosser's treatment of defendant's superior knowledge is charac13. But "control" should not be a condition for applying the doctrine. The determining factor should be the defendant's power-if not in the very case, at least In,
the class of case in question-to rebut the adverse inference. Control Is relevant
but not necessary. Control is in any case a hopelessly ambiguous concept. An Instrumentality once in defendant's control, e.g. as a manufacturer, may have been
handled since by many persons including the plaintiff without in any way, however,
altering the mechanical situation giving rise to the Inference of negligence; and when
at the time of harmful contact the defendant Is still closely connected with the Instrumentality-in "control" if you will-the plaintiff, too, may not have been completely passive with reference to its manipulation. But nevertheless If two conditions
are satisfied res ipsa should apply In such cases, though there Is far from Judicial
agreement that it does. These two conditions are: (1) a substantial probability that
defendant has done a risk-creating act of a described type, (2) a relation by defendant to the instrumentality at the putative time of such act enabling him to rebut the
Inference of its occurrence. Thus, In injuries arising from defects in manufactured
articlps where there is a probability that the defect was negligently produced the doctrine will apply though later parties or the plaintiff have handled or used It. Where,
however, the very nature of the defect is Itself unclear and may be attributable to the
negligent or non-negligent acts of a number of persons depending on which defect
is assumed, the application of res ipsa becomes much more problematical. Curley v.
Ruppert, 188 Misc. 148, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 785, rev'd 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N. Y. S. 2d
578. (1st Dept. 1947) ; and see discussion of exploding bottle cases below. 'Where the
plaintiff has participated in the operation of the iniury-working mechanism at the time
of impact, courts have recently allowed the application of the doctrine conditioned
on a finding that the plaintiff was not negligent. Jesionowski v. Boston & Me. R., 329
U. S. 452 (1947); cf. Marceau v. Rutland Ry., 211 N. Y. 203. 105 N. E. 206 (1914);
MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. Rochester Gas, 271 App. Div. 367, 05 N. Y. 2d 560 (4th
Dept. 1946); Annotations 174 A. L. R. 608; 145 A. L. R. 870.
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teristic of his whole argument. "It is difficult," he says, "to believe that this
factor can ever be controlling. If the circumstances are such as to create a
reasonable inference of the defendant's negligence, it cannot be supposed that
the inference will ever be defeated by a showing that the defendant knows
nothing about what has happened, and if the facts give rise to no such inference, a plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first instance can scarcely
make out a case merely by proving that he knows less about the matter than
his adversary. 1 .
If as is stated in the first hypothesis the plaintiff has already made a case,
of course the defendant's ignorance cannot defeat it and no doctrine of res
ipsa is needed to help the plaintiff. What is objectionable in the quoted statement is the second hypothesis and the assertion based on it: namely that if
the inference of negligence is not sufficient the case cannot go to the jury
though the defendant has peculiar control of facts which would enable the jury
to apply--or reject-a substantial but indefinite probability. There is in my
opiniorf a legitimate place for a doctrine of res ipsa which operates in the
absence of a less than adequate inference where the defendant is typically in
control of the key facts. 5 The doctrine of burden of proof as we have come to
know it has never been the uniform basis for proving a case. The constant
creation of presumptions attests this. The great object of the rules concerning
burdens is to mediate between the plaintiff's problem of proving a presumptively good cause of action and the defendant's problem of proving a presupmptively good defense. The ordinary rule of burden of proof is taken in
the general run of cases to be a fair solution but in particular cases the rule
maye be unfair and I suggest that in the type of case in question it is unfair.
I am willing to accept.Judge Lehman's analysis in Galbraithv. Busch that the
plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof of negligence but I question whether the
case was rightly decided. Unless the case is to be justified on very special
grounds of policy, it is to my mind a proper one for the application of res ipsa.
If we assume with the Court that the probability of negligence is at least 50%,
then it would appear just to impose on the driver a duty to explain the accident.
Judge Lehman argued that it might have been the mechanism rather than the
driving which was at fault and that the" driver was not responsible for the
mechanism. But if the mechanism was at fault the owner is in a superior
position to demonstrate the fact. Galbraithv. Busch involved litigation between relatives. It appears from te dissenting opinion that the Court may
have feared that in suitsbetween relatives or friends the application of res ipsa
would promote collusion at the expense of insurers. But a-claim for protection
14. Prosser at 203.
15. In Griffen v. Manice,.166 N.Y. 188 at 193-4, 59 N. E. 925 at 926-7 (1901),
the Court emphasizes the power to produce evidence: "where the defendant has
knowledge of a fact but slight evidence is requisite to shift on him the burden of
explanation."
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against negligent injury should not be denied an otherwise rational method of
proof just because there is insurance.
A more recent case"0 follows Galbraith though there is no factor of collusion. The plaintiff, a tenant of defendant, rented the ground floor of defendant's building. Water dripped from the ceiling of plaintiff's store damaging his personal property. The majority of the Court non-suited the plaintiff
because it was as likely that the water came from next door as from the second
story plumbing. To my mind, the minority's solution is more just. The landlord
was in control of the upper premises and was in a superior position to explain
the cause of the accident.
A frequent occasion for the appropriate application of res ipsa is a situation which suggests the negligence of one or more of a group of defendants
but does not point with sufficient logic to any particular defendant. According
to Dean Prosser the suit must be dismissed even though the defendants are in
a position to offer an explanation. He cites a number of California cases
supporting the proposition but does not at that point refer to a recent California
t
case which is a most dramatic example to the contrary. In Ybarrav. Spangard'
the plaintiff was operated on in a private hospital and offered proof that immediately following the operation he had suffered a serious injury which could
have been in the opinion of the plaintiff's experts a consequence of improper
treatment during the operation. Plaintiff sued the owner of the hospital, the
anesthetist, an employee of the anesthetist who adjusted his head on the
operating table, a nurse who wheeled him into the operating room, a nurse
who was in his room when he awoke, and, to be sure, the doctor who performed
the operation. The Court held that on no more evidence than has been stated
above there was a case for the jury against each and every one of the de.
fendants! The Court rested its decision primarily on th- superior accessibility
of the defendants to the evidence. It is highly questionable whether this
reason supports a case against any of the nurses; as applied to them it suggests
the strange principle that whoever has access to evidence is a proper defendant regardless of any duty to exercise care. Dean Prosser, speaking of
the case in another connection, suggests that it reflects the difficulty of proving
cases against medical men because of the unwillingness of medical men to
136
16. Silver v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 261 App. Div. 283, 25 N. Y. S. 2d Div.
App.
(1st Dept. 1941). See also Meibohm v. Horton Pilsener Brewing Co., 259
the writer
236, 18 N.Y. S. 2d 878 (1st Dept. 1940), where a defendant, improperly, asmere
occurbelieves, was not required to explain an explosion on his premises. "The the burden
rence of the event" hardly affords sufficient basis for casting on defendant By what
of explanation. "There should be at least some proof of what exploded."
ex.
standard does the court require that there should be at least some proof oftowhat
indulge
ploded? Possibly, on the ground that otherwise you are not in a position considered,
in speculation about negligence. But it should be enough that, abstractly the avenue
there is some probability of negligence, where defendant is in control of
to the facts.
17. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d (1944).
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testify against each other. Yet that may be thought of as indeed the very condition was res ipsa brings into play, namely, defendant's virtual control of the
evidence. It has, he says, little to do with "the ordinary notion of res ipsa."
If we accept his notion of res ipsa it does indeed have little to do with, it, but
if we base our conception of res ipsa on what use is in fact being made of it
then it is a very striking example of the doctrine as we have identified it, at
least as applied to the operating doctors.'8
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals indicates that at least in the
case of multiple defendants res ipsa will be applied without reference to the
balance of probabilities. In so doing it probably overruled sub silentio an
earlier case in which traditional notions of burdens of proof were applied.
Both cases concerned injury in a public street to a person passing a construction job. In Wolf v. American Tract Society," the plaintiff was hit by a falling
brick. There were 19 contractors. The plaintiff was non-suited. The Court
admitted that under res ipsa there was an inference of negligence but no inference as to who was negligent. "Cases must occasionally happen," said the
Court, "where the person really responsible for a personal injury cannot be
identified or pointed out by proof, as in this case, and then it is far better and
more consistent with reason and law that the injury should go without redress
than that innocent persons should be held responsible * * *."' In the recent
case of Schroeder v. City & County Savings Bank' a scaffolding fell down.
There were two contractors, one of whom erected it. The scaffold fell while
the other was on the job. It was held that there was a sufficient case against
both. "They were the ones who knew the cause of the collapse. It is not
necessary for the applicability of res ispa loquitur that there be but a single
person in control of that which caused the damage. * * * it is for them to explain their action."'
The Wolf case might be justified on the ground that the
falling of a brick is so fortuitous an event that no one of nineteen contractors
would be in a position to explain it. Indeed one of the most vexed questions
in connection with res ipsa is the nature of the burden of rebuttal which it
places on the defendant, and it is part of my thesis that that problem will be
more fairly solved if the distinctions urged in this paper are kept in mind.
I would like then to turn for a moment to the problem of rebuttal. The
usually accepted procedural effect of res ipsa stops somewhere short of shifting
18. The plaintiff's case should, however, have been dismissed after the rebuttal
testimony on the second trial. See infra.
19. 164 N. Y. 30, 58 N. E. 31 (1900).
2. Id. at 34, 58 N. E. at 32. In these days of awareness of the availability of
liability insurance, we would no longer be so concerned about the plight of an "innocent person."
21. 293 N. Y. 370,57 N. E. 2d 57 (1944).
22. M. at 374, 57 N. E. 2d at 59.
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the burden of proof. It must be confessed that the line is a subtle one, perhaps
too subtle for all juries and most lawyers. But it is insisted upon by many
courts and therefore lawyers must do their best to understand it. It is said
that-as in cases of presumption-the defendant must produce a balance rather
than a preponderance. If the case reaches the jury it is hardly to be supposed
that it will make this distinction. But the distinction may be seen to operate
in deciding the question of whether the case shall go to the jury. A good illustration of this concerns the presumption under Section 59 of the Motor Vehicle
Act that the driver of an automobile is driving with the permission of the owner.
In St. Andrassey v. Mooney" the owner presented the testimony of his discharged chauffeur, the driver, that he had not received permission. It was
held in an opinion by Judge Lehman that this rebutted the presumption as a
matter of law. The owner had discharged his burden by proudcing believable
evidence, i.e., evidence which there was no very good reason for disbelieving.
Now I think that it is clear that if the owner had the burden of proof he would
not have been entitled to a directed verdict. He would have been compelled
to take the risk of the jury's non-persuasion. The jury might have reasonable
rejected the chauffeur's testimony because of his interest in a good reference
or in the future favor of his old employer.
In my opinion, a similar rule should be applied to res ipsa. If res ipsa
is just a species of circumstantial evidence, the contrary evidence offered by
the defendant would in the usual case create a mere conflict of evidence for
resolution by a jury. I would be prepared to agree that in many instances
where res ipsa is invoked the case could go to the jury on ordinary principles
of proof. If there is evidence that the defendant tried, unsuccessfully, to drive
his car over a curve at 60 miles per hour, contrary testimony that his speed was
25 miles would not take the case from the jury. But if as in Galbraithv. Busch
where there was no evidence dealing with the car's operation, the defendant
presents a mechanic who testifies that he examined the wreck and found a
broken steering wheel, the defendant should be entitled to a directed verdict.
This conclusion follows from the correct understanding of the function and
justification of res ipsa. There is, we have said, in such a case an indeterminate
probability of negligent operation, but there is no rational process for making
a conclusion one way or the other. The defendant, however, holds a probable
key to the solution and fairness demands that what he may know he should
produce. If he produces a reasonably satisfactory explanation nothing more
in fairness can be demanded of him. And why should he be subjected to the
mercy of a jury which, given his explanation, has less than ever reason for
conjecturing the facts to be favorable to the plaintiff?
Now, in the example of rebuttal which I have given I have outrageously
simplified a very considerable problem. It will be noticed that in this example
23. 262 N. Y. 368, 186 N.E. 867 (1933).
10
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the defendant has been able to bring forward a disinterested witness who can
give a circumstantial and satisfying explanation. Many courts in such a case
will direct a verdict for defendant"' -though there are others which will not do
so even here. But it is usually said that the defendant can never have a
direction based on his own evidence or the evidence of interested witnesses.
And in certain type situations this will be the only available evidence. Indeed,
that fact may be implicit in the proposition that the defendant is in control of
the instrumentality. It is for that reason that he must explain; yet his explanation will not avail to keep from the jury a case which on our hypothesis
admits of no conclusion in the plaintiff's favor, other than one based on conjecture. We can comfort ourselves by observing once more that in many of
these cases res ipsa is a redundant description of an otherwise adequate case.
There are, for example, those cases where rats, snails, bits of human toes,
and old cigar stubs have been pickled in coca-cola bottles. No amount of
explanation, short of a catalyptic fit by the only possible employee-bottler,
will overcome a valid inference of negligence. But if in Ybarra v. Spangler
each participant in the operation states exactly what he did," or if as in one of
the California cases involving a Galbraithv. Busch situation the driver states
that a car coming from the opposite direction without lights crowded him off
the road, what more can the defendant do ? Following our argument it would
appear that, if in such cases the defendant's explanation is not to be accepted,
the doctrine of res ipsa should not be applied at all. It is something of a
mockery to require the defendant in the name of fairness to offer an explanation and then let a jury ignore the explanation on no other basis than its
choice not to believe. It is no answer to this argument that questions of
belief are for the jury. Where a party has the burden of proof, he must take
the risk of not convincing. But, by hypothesis, the defendant in these cases
does not have the burden of proof. The occasion calls for explanation and he
has, as far as it can be judged, given a complete explanation to the limits of
his power. Even accepting this line of argument, it would not follow that any
explanation suffices which the defendant chooses to give. If it appears that
the defendant has not taken the pains to find out what lies in his power, or if
he evades explanation at a crucial point, or if his evidence itself suggests mendacity, he has not destroyed the inference or the presumption and must submit
to the jury or to a directed verdict.
As Dean Prosser points out, if on the slightest of evidence from plaintiff
and the fullest of explanations from the defendant, the case is nevertheless
put to the jury, the result is in effec' a change in the burden of proof and, it
24. E.g. Melia v. Ry., 159 Misc. 293,286 N. Y. Supp. 501 (City Ct. N. Y. 1936).
25. Professor Seavey points out that on the retrial there was evidence not even
mentioned by the reviewing court-after the retrial-that plaintiff's teeth were diseased and that there was expert testimony to the effect that such disease may have
caused the harm to the arm. SEAvEY, KEETON, THURSTON, CASES ON TORTS (1950) 216.
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may be, even in the basis of.liability. The cases dealing with exploding bottles
illustrate the puzzling and dynamic ambiguities in this field. Again we can
compare a California and a New York case. Both were suits against the bottler
of a carbonated beverage (in the New York case coupled with a suit against
the manufacturer of the bottle). In the New York case" there was no reference to the doctrine of res ipsa, but the case against the bottler was handled
on that basis and disposed of as I have suggested it should be. The bottler
put in testimony of his methods of inspection. Upon receipt of the bottles he
put one or two out of each gross under the pressure guaranteed by the manufacturer. He tested every filled bottle by a test which would catch undue
pressure and some defects in the bottle but not all defects. These were the
tests customary in the bottling trade. Tests customary in the manufacturing
trade would reveal certain defects in the bottle not revealed by the bottler's
tests, but again not all defects. It was held that the bottler's testimony entitled
it to a directed verdict. What did this holding involve? First, it would seem,
a ruling that as a matter of law the bottler's tests were sufficient. He might
in other words rely on the manufacturer for certain tests normally performed
at that stage (division of labor on testing) and second (and very pertinent to
our concern here), the defendant's own testimony (through its employees etc.)
as to what its tests were and that it did test is taken at its face value as a conclusive rebuttal.
The California case" comes to the opposite conclusion. It talks the
language of res ipsa and liability rather indiscriminately. "Where defects are
discoverable, it may be assumed that they will not ordinarily escape detection"
which implies that the bottler must apply every known test. But what of undiscoverable ones? Well, the manufacturers have a test which is "pretty near"
infallible and so it will be assumed that when the bottles reached the bottler
they had no defects, at least none not discoverable by visual inspection! Thus,
no doubt depending on who is the defendant, bottler or manufacturer, it can
be demonstrated that one is negligent by assuming that the other is not and
should have taken all of the precautions that Either might have taken. " Finally,
the evidence of the defendant as to his methods is" a question of fact for the
26. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932).
27. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944).
28. This form of reasoning was explicitly repudiated in Curley v. Rappert, supra
n. 13. In this case the plaintiff did not introduce the broken pieces of the bottle so
that nothing was known of the character of the defect. If it were assumed that the
manufacturer had done his duty, then it might be argued according to the Escola case
in the preceding footnote that either there was a discoverable defect or improper
bottling. This, of course, ignores the possibility suggested in the Peerless case of a
non-discoverable defect-at least of such as might be discovered by methods commonly in use among bottlers. In Saglimberi v. West End Brewing Co., 274 App. Div.
201, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 635, aff'd 298 N. Y. 875, 84 N. E. 2d 638 (1949), recoveries against

Ballantine,273 App. Div. 217, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 383 (1st Dept. 1948), recoveries against
the bottler were based on the continued use of old bottles in one case and the explosion of a number of bottles in the other.
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jury." Mr. justice Traynor concurred specially on the ground that the bottler
should be absolutely liable on an extension of the notions of warranty.
"In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the
rule of strict liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis
of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If
public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their
quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility
openly."
We professors prefer judge Traynor's clear, analytic approach. Indeed,
prime purpose is to analyze as clearly as possible the function of
paper's
this
res ipsa, to exhibit it as a species of inference or presumption operating and justifiably so in a given case - somewhere between a rational circumstantial case on the one hand and a shift of the burden of proof or change in
liability on the other. But I do not insist that the way of judge Traynor-who
having been a professor before he was a judge, can probably never shake the
professorial passion for neat classification-is the only way. The law has
traditionally moved from one doctrinal peak to another through the misty vales
of fiction. For this it has its reasons, some good and some not so good. An
outright rejection of an old doctrine in favor of a new may seem a gross
assertion of naked power. A slow approach allows an opportunity for discussion, for testing the implication of an emerging doctrine. It allows time
or acclimatization, for acceptance or rejection-by the bar and its clientele.
It allows the court to beat a strategic or merely tactical retreat in the rare case
where the application of the new doctrine is shocking. These considerations
may appear to weaken my claim that res ipsa fulfils its function when the
defendant has offered a complete explanation in terms of negligence. And to
some degree they do. It depends, I would say, on what the court sees as the
function of res ipsa in the case at hand. If it is a stage in the evolution of a
new basis of liability, if it is being used as a fiction, it will take the case to the
jury irrespective of the evidence as it did in the Escola case. If it is a device
to assist the plaintiff to succeed on the presently stated basis of liability, then
as in Peerless Glass case, the defendant's explanation may entitle him to a
directed verdict. If, as some think, the concept of negligence is irrelevant
in the context of most modern cases (at least in those involving automobiles,
trains, machinery, etc.), res ipsa will be used wherever possible as a fiction.
Evidence from whatever source will be irrelevant except in cases so inexorably
clear that a refusal to direct a verdict would require the explicit rejection of
the assumed rule of liability.
Finally, I advert to two developments which might be thought to render
res ipsa obsolete. One is the increasingly broadened scope of discovery; the
other a change in the basic conception of proof at least in the negligence field.
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It has been possible for some time to examine the defendant both before and
at the trial. It can be argued that if this is so the defendant is never in "control" of the evidence." But there have been courts which have held that the
proponent of a witness even when the witness is his opponent is "bound" by
his evidence. In enlightened jurisdictions this incredible rule is abrogated by
decision, rule of court, or statute. But even-so, being able to ask an opponent
questions, albeit without risk, is inferior- to the right to compel him to make
on his own initiative a full accounting.
But more basic to the present status of res ipsa is the fact that the concept
of proof or perhaps the concept of negligence itself is undergoing a change.
So far we have examined the question in the light of the traditional notion that
the conclusion that the defendant was negligent can not be based on "speculation and conjecture." This I have argued means, as Judge Lehman held in
Galbraithv. Busch, that it is not enough that there is a substantial "probability"
of negligence. The jury must have evidence by which it can convert the probability into a finding. But in recent cases the Supreme Court has come close to
challenging this concept. In Lavender v. Kurn," a case arising under the
Federal Employers Liability Act, Mr. Justice Murphy, reversing and answering
the Missouri Supreme Court which had dismissed an employee's suit, said:
"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and
conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fairminded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute
by choosing what seems the most reasonable inference."" 1
Read closely, this announces no new doctrine since it implies that the
evidence provided a basis for making "the most reasonable inference." But
a study of the evidence in that case would lead me at least to the conclusion
that there was no more reason for attributing the accident to the defendant
railroad's negligence, than to the deceased man's negligence, or the vicious
act of a third person, or a combination of circumstances involving no fault
on anyone's part. 'We must not go too fast in drawing conclusions from
29. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 46 (1947), plaintiff and a fellow seaman, Dudder, were rounding in two blocks. One block was attached to a boom, the
other was held by Dudder, and plaintiff was taking in the slack. The block in Dudder's
hand fell on plaintiff knocking him unconscious. Plaintiff testified that at the time
he was coiling the rope. Dudder was available as a witness, as was his disposition
taken by the defendant, the United States. Neither side used Dudder or his deposition. The Supreme Court reversing the Court of Appeals held that res ipsa applied.
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton dissenting argued that res ipsa was not
applicable because evidence concerning Dudder's conduct was available. At the least
the trial judge should have called Dudder as the court's witness.
30. 327 U. S. 645 (1946).
31. Id. at 653. But see Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., - U. S. -, 71 S. Ct.
428, at 430 (1951).
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Lavender v. Kurn. The FELA serves as a glorified workmen's compensation,
and the Supreme Court has gone very far in dispensing with meaningful notions of both negligence and actual causation. But everyone is aware that there
are similar trends in the automobile and railroad crossing cases. What we are
coming to is not necessarily the adoption of a rule of absolute liability but of
liability not limited to the reasoned probability in the particular case; liability
based rather on a substantial probability of negligence and/or causation in
the type of case. In so far as this is so, it then becomes true that res ipsa
serves no function. But it is, I think, grossly unhistorical to say that this has
always been so. Quite to the contrary I would argue-that res ipsa has been one
of a group of devices which have been and are still being used to revise the
concepts of liability and proof. On this view res ipsa has not been an anomalous monster. Its form and function through the years may have been ambiguous and confused, in considerable measure redundant, but it is in this
groping way that the law realizes its destiny of change. And there may still
be areas where given an accepted basis of liability the device of res ipsa will
serve fairly to apportion among the parties the burden of proof.

